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1Abstract
This paper considers share repurchases as the way long-term shareholders pre-
serve their ability to use corporate information for speculative purposes when
insider trading regulation is enforced. This use of corporate information in-
creases the adverse selection losses of short-term shareholders. Thus, buy-back
programs reduce their incentive to invest in stocks that back the most productive
technology, leading to a socially ineﬃcient equilibrium. It follows that insider
trading should not be banned when share repurchases are allowed.
JEL classiﬁcation: G18, G14, D82, K22
Keywords: insider trading, share repurchase, liquidity, securities regulation, cor-
porate information
21 Introduction
The legal arguments for a ban on insider trading are converging to the view that in-
side information is a property of the corporation and insider trading is akin to theft
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Economists (King and Ro¨ ell, 1988; Dow and Rahi,
2003; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991) also contend that insider traders misappropri-
ate corporate property because the insiders proﬁt from information even though they
do not have property rights over it. Consistent with this view, this paper models
inside information as a corporate asset which is used by the ﬁrm. It may thus choose
to disclose information to market participants or to keep it secret. Moreover, the
company may perform open market share repurchases in order to correct misvalua-
tion. We study these alternative corporate information policies, in the polar cases
when insider trading is legal or is eﬀectively prohibited on misappropriation grounds,
so as to assess the beneﬁts of insider trading regulation1.
The existing literature ﬁnds that insider trading should be regulated when the
adverse selection losses caused to investors in the stock market exceed improvements
in ﬁrm interim investment choice (Bernhardt, Holliﬁeld and Hughson, 1995; Leland,
1992) or in risk sharing among investors (Bhattacharya and Nicodano, 2001) brought
about by insider trading. In order to single out the incremental contribution of our
model, we do not consider these potential sources of beneﬁts, as there is neither
interim investment nor risk aversion. Hence insider trading should reduce welfare,
and its regulation be beneﬁcial. On the contrary, we show that banning insider
trading is welfare diminishing.
Indeed long term shareholders, who are assumed to be in control of corporate
policies and to observe inside information, would trade on it when insider trading
is unrestricted. This is mostly proﬁtable to them when the company refrains from
both repurchasing shares and disclosing information to the market, implying that
these become the corporate information policies when no regulation discourages in-
sider trading. The equilibrium policy shifts instead to stock repurchases when insider
trading is eﬀectively banned. Share repurchases become the way long-term sharehold-
ers preserve their ability to use corporate information so as to maximize the value
of their stockholdings. But this new allocation of corporate information worsens the
welfare of the short-term shareholders, who suﬀer from adverse selection losses when
trading in the marketplace: their losses increase because the ﬁrm is a monopolist
information trader that maximizes both its trading proﬁts and the negative external-
1U.S. courts increasingly rely on the misappropriation theory to decide insider trading cases (Lehn,
1989). This holds that an individual violates Rule 10b − 5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
if he or she knowingly trades on information that is used without the consent of its source.
3ity on market liquidity. Thus open-market share repurchases reduce their incentive
to invest in stocks that back the most productive technology, leading to a socially
ineﬃcient equilibrium. It follows that insider trading should not be banned when
open market share repurchases are allowed.
Clearly, a ban on such information-based share repurchase coupled with insider
trading restrictions would improve on welfare, by eliminating all sources of adverse
selection and preserving short-term traders’ incentives to invest in stocks. However,
we observe that such restrictions cannot be supported on misappropriation grounds,
as the ﬁrm is making proﬁts out of stock mispricing on behalf of all shareholders. Fur-
thermore, share repurchase (SR) programs are usually not banned in the real world,
and their use is instead spreading, as regulators recognize that they may be useful
for substituting cash dividend payouts, modifying capital structure, implementing
stock option plans and providing price stabilization2. While acknowledging these
objectives for SR, regulators explicitly recognize and worry about the “privileged
informational position of the issuer” when share repurchase programs are imple-
mented (see OICV-IOSCO, 2004, p.10-12). Other indicators support our focus on
ﬁrms’ superior information when repurchasing shares. Firstly, it has been found that
ﬁrms usually repurchase stock in order to take advantage of potential undervaluation
(Dittmar, 2000) and that there are signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns several years
after repurchase announcements (Ikenberry et al, 1995; Mitchell and Staﬀord, 2000).
Secondly, Barclay and Smith (1988) ﬁnd wider bid ask spreads for ﬁrms planning and
announcing share repurchases, implying that market liquidity worsens. Last but not
least, Brockman and Chung (2001) show that the adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread increases substantially during repurchase periods, consistent with the
hypothesis of information-based buy-backs.
In our model we focus on share repurchase performed through open market trad-
ing by the company. This is the most common mechanism used by companies because
it gives them ﬂexibility as to the timing, price and size of repurchases3. The term
“stock repurchase” indicates in the model both the buying and the selling of own
shares by the company. Indeed only a few jurisdictions, including the U.S., treat the
selling of repurchased shares as a new distribution subject to a prospectus oﬀering
or require cancellation of repurchased shares. Several others permit an issuer to sell
its own shares held “in treasury” before, during, and after a stock repurchase plan
(OICV-IOSCO, 2004, p.7,8,9).
2See OICV-IOSCO (2004, p.3). The relative importance of these goals are debated in a large
empirical literature, see Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) as well as references therein.
3Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that they constitute 90% of total repurchases performed
in the U.S..Studies of alternative mechanisms include Brennan and Thakor (1990) analysis of self
tender oﬀers and Peyer and Vermaelen’s (2005) empirical investigation of privately negotiated SR.
4Our argument for unrestricted insider trading hinges on larger losses hitting short-
term shareholders when the ﬁrm repurchases shares. This argument does not hold
only for companies with diﬀuse ownership4. In such ﬁrms, proﬁts from share repur-
chases are almost entirely paid back to short-term shareholders, thus causing them
little loss. Moreover, insiders are too few to compete very aggressively relative to the
case of the monopolist ﬁrm.
For all other companies, one way to reduce adverse selection losses is disclosure
of inside information by the ﬁrm. However, disclosure in our setting is never a cor-
porate policy, unless we drop the realistic assumption that long-term shareholders
determine corporate choices5. With mandated disclosure our conclusion that insider
trading should be unregulated when open market share repuchase are allowed holds
true, unless announcements occur without delays. Mandated disclosure should not
be associated with insider trading regulation as information-based open-market share
repurchases would again substitute for insider trading, increasing short-term share-
holders losses.
Our paper thus delivers new insights by considering insider trading, stock repur-
chases and disclosure as competing uses of corporate information. This new approach
straddles three branches of research. Earlier literature on information production and
dissemination acknlowledges that valuable information is produced by ﬁrms and could
voluntarily be disclosed (Diamond, 1985; Fishman and Hagerty,1989). It further sug-
gests that intermediaries have an incentive to sell or trade on information (Allen,
1989, 1990; Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1986, 1988a). But it does not consider inside
information as a corporate asset, and the associated opportunity for ﬁrms themselves
to trade and sell on inside information6.
Seminal papers on share repurchases treat them as an alternative to dividends
for paying out corporate proﬁts (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Bhattacharya, 1979).
Barclay and Smith (1988) consider that they can generate adverse selection costs
in the stock market. However, in their model share repurchase programs are still
considered as a distribution policy rather than a corporate information policy7. Re-
4These do not seem to be common outside Anglo-saxon countries, as companies – especially
smaller ones – usually have concentrated ownership (see Becht et al., 2002, and references therein)
5Independent board members, that represent non-controlling shareholders’ preferences, are typ-
ically a minority. Moreover, their appointment by controlling shareholders often weakens their
incentives to vote against them. Similarly, short-term shareholders do not usually participate in
shareholders’ meetings. See Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2002
6A previous version of this paper, available from the authors upon request, analyzes the case of
corporate information sales which is sidestepped here for simplicity.
7Brennan and Thakor (1990) make a related point. They observe that repurchases oblige share-
holders to trade in order to obtain a desired level of dividends. In doing so, smaller less informed
5cently, Oded (2005) shows that a ﬁrm can signal its value to the market by simply
announcing share repurchases because it can buy back in the future conditional on
its information. In this paper we take these information-based repurchases as given,
and ask what they imply for insider trading regulation.
Finally, an insider trader is not appropriating a corporate asset in the insider
trading literature. He is often depicted as an agent with lower costs of information
acquisition than ﬁnancial analysts (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992) and, more generally,
better information than his trading counterparts (Kyle, 1985). Sometimes she is a
corporate insider, as in Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001), John and Narayanan
(1997) and Medrano and Vives (2004), but only in the sense that she is subject
to regulation imposing disclosure of her trades and accordingly changes her trading
strategy. In one case the insider is explicitly misappropriating corporate information
(Manove, 1989) but no alternative use of inside information by the company is allowed
for. Khanna et al. (1994) implicitly assume that inside information is a corporate
asset, by allowing the controlling shareholder to implicitly sell inside information
to a manager for insider trading purposes. They also emphasize that short-term
shareholders anticipate their adverse selection losses when deciding whether to invest
in the risky asset, as we do. However, they study the interplay of ﬁnancial analysis,
insider trading and production, while we emphasize the link between insider trading,
stock repurchases and disclosure.
Another feature of our paper is the conﬂict of interest between controlling share-
holders and short-term shareholders, which is aﬀected by insider trading regulation.
The analysis in Maug (2002) also connects the conﬂict of interest between types
of shareholders to insider trading legislation – speciﬁcally tippee liability. He argues
that managers of underperforming companies collude against small shareholders with
dominant shareholders, who give up their monitoring role in favour of insider trading
when this is unrestricted. He suggests that there is instead alignment of all sharehold-
ers’ incentives when a ban is enacted, because this prevents managers from tipping
dominant blockholders about worsening ﬁrm proﬁtability. By considering the case of
information-based share repurchases, we highlight that such an alignment need not
hold.
A key insight, driving our result on welfare reducing insider trading regulation, is
that a monopolistic information trader minimizes the leakage of information through
prices. This is due to Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), by whom we also borrow the
modelling of the trading subgame. In a dynamic setting, Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) analysis supports their results. On the contrary Back, Cao and Willard (2000)
shareholders run the risk of partial expropriation by better informed shareholders who prefer repur-
chases over cash distribution.
6argue that this is not the case when traders’ signals are diverse, as they will trade less
aggressively recognizing their incentive to reduce competition. In the case of insiders,
however, the signal of the traders will be (close to) perfectly correlated, leading to
the same type of insight obtained in the static setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 describes the equilibrium allocation and the welfare analysis. Section 4
examines alternative securities regulations. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 The Model
There are two types of agents: long-term investors and liquidity traders. At time 0,
they can store their unit endowment, with no depreciation. Alternatively, they can
become shareholders by investing it in a risky, long-term technology with expected
return ¯ q > 1. In what follows we denote with n∗ (m∗) the number of long-term
investors (liquidity traders) and with n (m) the number of investors who become
long-term shareholders (liquidity shareholders). Let’s ﬁnally deﬁne N∗ = m∗ + n∗
and N = m + n as the total number of investors and shareholders, respectively.
Liquidity traders, m∗ > 1, know that they will be hit by an endowment shock
in the future: if they invest in the risky technology at time 0, they will inelastically
supply (or demand) an unknown amount of shares at time 2. These investors are
similar to the “discretionary” liquidity traders of Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988b).
They have discretion only ex-ante, in choosing whether to invest their endowment at
positive return and bear future trading costs or store it with zero net return.On the
contrary, long-term shareholders, who will manage the company and observe inside
information, will be able to trade shares only if it pays them to. They can also decide
whether to trade on inside information, provided that insider trading regulation is
not enforced. So, let’s deﬁne j(c) as the number of insider traders conditional on
insider trading regulation, where the variable c indicates whether that regulation is
enforced (c = 1) or not (c = 0):
j(c) =

∈ [0,n] if c = 0
0 if c = 1
(1)
In our setting corporate assets include inside information. This is a noisy signal
q+ϑ of liquidation value, which is costlessly produced within the ﬁrm between t = 1










and Cov(q,ϑ) = 0. Hence, long-term
shareholders must decide the corporate information policy8. The policy set, CP, is
8Within this setting we do not have to face any delegation problem, which, instead, may arise if
7Table 1: Classiﬁcation of corporate policies
cp = {0,0}: secrecy
cp = {1,0}: open-market share repurchases
cp = {0, ¯ d}: disclosure
cp = {1, ¯ d}: disclosure and open-market share repurchases
a ﬁnite set of four elements deﬁned by two components: cp = {k,d}. The ﬁrst one
deﬁnes whether the company carries out open-market share repurchases (k = 1), thus
becoming an informed speculator. The second one indicates truthful disclosure to the
market (d = ¯ d) or secrecy (d = 0). In case of disclosure, we assume that the signal
can be costlessly transmitted to the public, who know the distribution of payoﬀs and
signals and hence the reliability of information. However, we also assume that there
exists a strictly positive probability, 1 − ¯ d, that liquidity shocks are realized before
disclosure. This is because time necessarily elapses between information production
and its transmission – at least the time for preparing the public statement9. As a
consequence, the choice between disclosure and secrecy turns out to be equivalent
to the choice between the two probabilities. A classiﬁcation of corporate policies is
summarized in Table 1.
At time 2, inside information is distributed according to previous decisions and
asset trading takes place. The sequence of events is summarized in Table 2.
2.1 The trading subgame
In this section we determine equilibrium stock price, P, and the value of a right
to trade on inside information, π, conditional on corporate information policy. We
start by addressing the case when corporate information does not reach the market
through a public announcement before trading occurs.
liquidity shareholders had the majority. Thus, as in Brennan and Thakor (1990), we avoid relying
on an arbitrarily assumed objective function of a manager. In our model this would be a useless
complication, since our focus is not managerial incentives, as in Fischer (1992).
9We are not referring here to postponements decided by the ﬁrm for strategic reasons, such as
those related to proprietary information, but to technical delays.
8Table 2: Sequence of events
Time 0: n
∗ long-term and m
∗ liquidity investors invest their unit endowment either in the risky
technology, with expected return ¯ q > 1, or in the risk-free asset.
Time 1: Long-term shareholders choose the allocation of rights over inside information, through
corporate policy decision.
Time 2: Corporate policy is carried out, liquidity shocks are realized and stock trading takes
place.
Time 3: Risky technology return, q, is realized and distributed together with proﬁts from stock
repurchases.
The trading structure is as follows. Risk-neutral speculators can borrow at zero
interest rate and submit orders to a market-maker, who also receives price-inelastic
orders from liquidity shareholders. As in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988a), the market-
maker infers information from the order ﬂow and prices the security so as to obtain
zero expected proﬁts. In such a setting a rational speculator enters the market only
when he is better informed than the market-maker (AP, 1988a, p.98). In our model
this is the case only for long-term shareholders and for the company.
Let x = β(q + ϑ − ¯ q), where β is a constant to be determined, be the orders
submitted by an informed speculator who maximizes his expected trading proﬁts
given his information. Each liquidity trader submits a market order ξi ∼ N(0,σ2
ξ),
which is i.i.d across i and independent from other random variables. Net liquidity
orders are equal to z, where σ2
z = mσ2
ξ. The market-maker sets a price equal to the
expected liquidation value conditional on his information, which consists of inference
from the total order ﬂow ω and of corporate information released by the company.
The total order ﬂow ω is the sum of the orders placed by the liquidity traders, the
company (k ∈ {0,1}) and the j(c) insiders:
ω = z + (k + j(c))x
= z + (k + j(c))β(q + ϑ − ¯ q) (2)
The price set by the market-maker is given by:
P = E(q|ω) = ¯ q + λω (3)
where λ is a non-stochastic constant to be determined. The unique linear Nash
9equilibrium is found by following the same steps as AP (1988a, p.99). The equilibrium














(k + j(c) + 1)σ2
z
(5)
Equation (5) shows that the responsiveness of price to the order ﬂow is directly
proportional to (i) the intensity of informed traders’ reaction to their private signal,
(k+j(c))β; (ii) the relative responsiveness of the order ﬂow to both asset liquidation
value and liquidity shocks, as summarized by the ratio σ2
q/σ2
z. The parameter λ is
Kyle’s (1985) measure of market illiquidity.
We can now determine the value to a risk-neutral speculator of the right to trade
on inside information. This is equal to the expected diﬀerence in proﬁts from trading
with and without such information. But no-information proﬁts are nil: in fact, only





x E[(q − P)x|q + ϑ]
i
(6)
where price depends on x as shown by Equations (2) and (3). Using Equations (2)
- (5), the equilibrium value of the right for one speculator, when information is not
disclosed to the market prior to trading, is equal to:
π (k + j(c),m) = β
σ2
q





































This value falls if the variance of liquidity trading is lower, because the market-
maker is able to make more precise inference from the order ﬂow. It is inversely related
10to (k + j(c)) in that competitive speculators do not restrict their orders enough so
as to prevent more information to leak through the order ﬂow. Indeed, it is also
true that the total value of trading proﬁts to speculators, (k + j(c))π(k + j(c),m),
decreases as their number, (k + j(c)), grows.
If information reaches the market before trading occurs, then the market maker is
informed as the speculators, who therefore decide not to enter the market. It follows
that the right to trade on information has no value.
Hence, the ex-ante value of the right to trade for a speculator before corporate
policy is chosen is equal to (1−d)π. In fact we get back to Equation (7) if corporate
information policy is secrecy. If the ﬁrm chooses a disclosure policy, instead, proﬁts
will be reduced to (1 − ¯ d)π, where ¯ d is the probability that announcement happen
before trading.
2.2 The allocation of inside information by the company
We now turn to the allocation of inside information that the shareholders elect at time
1. Since long-term shareholders hold the majority, they will choose that corporate
policy (cp ∈ CP) that maximizes their expected payoﬀ, and then each shareholder will
receive a share 1/N of corporate proﬁts. In order to compute shareholders’ payoﬀs in
diﬀerent scenarios, we determine corporate distributions that are associated to each
information allocation.




0 if k = 0
(1−d)π(1+j(c),m)
N if k = 1
(8)
Proﬁts from corporate policy are positive only if the company trades on its private
information. Therefore, if open-market stock repurchases is corporate policy, total
receipts are equal to trading proﬁts when there are 1 + j(c) information traders
competing in the market, i.e. the company and j(c) insider traders. These are then
distributed to the N shareholders.
2.3 Ex-ante investment choice
The value of corporate information to each long-term shareholder, who is also an
insider trader, is non-negative under any corporate information policy. Indeed, he
11gets trading proﬁts from both corporate share repurchases and insider trading (when
this is unregulated). Thus, each long-term shareholder expected payoﬀ, conditional
on investing in the risky asset, turns out to be:
Er(WL) = ¯ q + (1 − d)[π(k + j(c),m)(1 − c)] + ϕ(k) (9)
From Equation (9) it is straightforward to see that the expected payoﬀ to a
long-term shareholder is never less than one, which is the payoﬀ of storing the unit
endowment. This is the reason why all long-term investors become shareholders of
the risky technology. Thus, n = n∗.
Short-term investors (liquidity traders) may instead suﬀer from adverse selection
losses coming from either open-market stock repurchases or insider trading or both,
the more, the lower is market liquidity. Since the market-maker obtains zero prof-
its, expected trading gains to informed speculators equal expected losses by liquidity
traders. Hence, each liquidity shareholder’s expected payoﬀ conditional on holding
one unit of the risky technology (denoted by subscript r) must be calculated net of
L(), expected per-capita trading losses diminished by proﬁts from corporate infor-
mation trading.
Er(WS) = ¯ q − L(k,d,j(c),m) (10)
where






Therefore, in order to invest in the risky technology, short-term investors’ ex-
pected payoﬀ must be no lower than one, which is the investors’ expected payoﬀ
conditional on storing the unit endowment:
¯ q − 1 > L(k,d,j(c),m) (12)
If this inequality is not satisﬁed, they do not enter the stock market (m = 0) and
consequently there is underinvestment (N < N∗) in the risky technology.
Finally, expected aggregate welfare is deﬁned as the weighted sum of the investors’
unconditional expected payoﬀs:
E(W) ≡ n∗E(WL) + m∗E(WS) (13)
123 Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis
3.1 Insider trading regulation not enforced
In this Subsection we solve the model, assuming that insider trading regulation is
not enforced in the market (c = 0). So, we have to ﬁnd which corporate policy is
chosen at time 1, knowing that every long-term shareholder can potentially become
an insider trader.
Proposition 1: If insider trading regulation is not enforced, the equilibrium cor-
porate policy is secrecy, cp∗ = {0,0}. Every long-term shareholder becomes insider
trader, j(0) = n∗, and the number of short-term shareholders is equal to
m =

m∗ if ¯ q − 1 > L(0,0,n∗,m∗)
0 otherwise
(14)
Proof: See the Appendix.
We present here the logic of Proposition 1. Since corporate policy is chosen by
long-term shareholders, they try to minimize the revelation of private information
to the market. Hence, disclosure is always dominated by secrecy. Moreover, insider
traders would obtain a higher payoﬀ, with respect to the equilibrium one, if they acted
cooperatively, that is if they chose to both refrain from insider trading and carry out
open-market stock repurchases. In this way, they would exploit the advantage of one
monopolistic information trader, who minimizes the leakage of information through
prices, as in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988). However, the strategy no insider trading
associated to open-market stock repurchases as corporate policy is not a credible
one, thus causing the equilibrium strategy to be insider trading. This being the case,
they prefer to choose secrecy as corporate policy, because the beneﬁts from a lower
competition in the market more than compensate the costs from not receiving any
proﬁt from share repurchases. Finally, liquidity traders invest in the risky asset if
and only if the expected excess return compensates their adverse selection losses.
Remark 1: We are assuming that shareholders’ meetings choose share repurchases.
This is the case in European countries. However – in certain jurisdictions including
the U.S. – a decision of the board is suﬃcient. It is easy to show that equilibria do not
change when a subset of long-term shareholders choose on behalf of others as well.
133.2 Insider trading regulation enforced
Let’s consider now the case in which misappropriation of corporate information is
banned (c = 1). This means that, if enforcement is perfect, there are no insider
traders, j(1) = 0.
Proposition 2: If insider trading regulation is enforced, the equilibrium corporate
policy is open-market stock repurchases, cp∗ = {1,0}. Moreover, the number of short-
term shareholders is equal to
m =

m∗ if ¯ q − 1 > L(1,0,0,m∗)
0 otherwise
(15)
Proof: See the Appendix.
In this case insider trading regulation prevents long-term shareholders from using
individually their private information for speculative purposes. However, the regula-
tion paradoxically make it possible for them to collude with each other by carrying
out open-market repurchases. The stock market is therefore characterized by a sin-
gle speculator, that is the company. Finally, liquidity traders choose to invest in the
risky technology if and only if their adverse selection losses are compensated by the
expected excess return.
3.3 Welfare comparison
In order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of insider trading regulation, we must compare
expected aggregate welfare with and without insider trading regulation.
Lemma 2: The equilibrium expected aggregate welfare turns out to be
E(W) = n∗¯ q + m∗ + Pr(m = m∗) · m∗(¯ q − 1) (16)
where Pr(m = m∗) is a degenerate probability.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst best level of welfare, N∗¯ q, is reached if all investors enter the stock
market. This ensures that all endowments are invested in the risky technology, which
dominates the riskless one (¯ q > 1). Trading losses to one type of trader do not
matter for social welfare as they are oﬀset by gains to the others. Hence, for a welfare
comparison we need ﬁrst to order short-term investors’ expected losses, L(0,0,n∗,m∗)
and L(1,0,0,m∗).
14Proposition 3: Let’s deﬁne µ ≡ m∗/N∗. Assume that µ < µ0. Then liquidity
traders’ expected loss is lower if insider trading regulation is not enforced. Symmet-
rically, expected aggregate welfare is higher under no ban on misappropriation.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Results concerning aggregate welfare can best be understood by focusing on three
diﬀerent levels of the risky asset excess return.
(¯ q − 1) > L(1,0,0,m∗) If the excess return is very high, then liquidity traders are
more than compensated for adverse selection losses and so they invest in the risky
asset, irrespective of the insider trading regulation.
(¯ q − 1) < L(0,0,n∗,m∗) If the excess return is very low, then liquidity traders do
not receive enough compensation from investing in the risky asset, irrespective of the
insider trading regulation. Also in this case, the costless ban on insider trading is
useless since it does not lead to any increase in the expected aggregate welfare.
L(0,0,n∗,m∗) < (¯ q − 1) < L(1,0,0,m∗) In this case liquidity traders’ investment
decision changes according to the enforcement of insider trading regulation. In par-
ticular, without regulation, liquidity traders are still compensated enough for ad-
verse selection losses. They invest their endowments in the risky technology and
consequently the market is characterized by the highest level of expected aggregate
welfare (ﬁrst best). On the contrary, insider trading regulation induces liquidity
traders not to enter the market. This is so because the lower leakage of information
through prices, due to a monopolistic use of private information by the company
increases liquidity traders losses. Therefore, insider trading regulation imposes an
underinvestment cost, equal to m∗(¯ q − 1), and lowers expected aggregate welfare.
The boundaries of the last region are portrayed in Figure 5. The region widens
as both the variance of the liquidity shocks and the precision of inside information
increase, because a monopolistic trader is better able to exploit both relative to
competing insiders.
For insider trading regulation to reduce welfare, the proportion of liquidity share-
holders must not exceed a certain threshold (µ0). The reason is that proﬁts from SR
are paid out to all shareholders. The larger their relative number, the larger their
share of these proﬁts. In the limit, all their trading losses would be paid back to them
if they owned 100% of shares, in which case they would prefer SR to insider trading.
The threshold we are mentioning is increasing in n∗ (see the Appendix). The reason
is that more competition among insiders leads to lower trading losses to liquidity
investors. In order to appreciate this restriction, consider the case of small ﬁrms (i.e.
15N∗ = 30). Then m∗/N∗ should not exceed 50%. However, for middle-size companies
(N∗ = 543), m∗/N∗ can be as large as 80.67, and for very large ﬁrms (N∗ = 1066)
the threshold is 84.53. Thus, insider trading regulation may be beneﬁcial only for
companies with widely diﬀuse ownership.
According to Proposition 3, the answer to the question “should insider trading be
prohibited when share repurchases are allowed?” is negative. The ﬁrst two columns of
Table 3, which presents the equilibrium expected aggregate welfare and information
allocation, clearly show this result. This is so because insider trading regulation
turns out to be the instrument to make insider traders commitment to collude with
each other credible. Information-based open-market stock repurchases turn out to
be as the institutionalized way to create monopolistic insider proﬁts. For this reason
liquidity traders, who are the crucial players for achieving full investment in the
market, prefer to be the trading counterpart of competing insider traders rather than
of a monopolistic one.
4 Expanding Securities Regulation
Below we investigate whether other types of securities regulation may solve the un-
derinvestment problem associated with adverse selection.
4.1 Ban on share repurchases
We ﬁrst consider the introduction of a ban on open-market share repurchases. This
implies that the parameter k is exogenously set to zero, so that long-term shareholders
can only choose d.
Proposition 4: If insider trading regulation is not enforced, a ban on open-market
stock repurchases is never welfare improving. Secrecy is the equilibrium corporate
policy, cp∗ = {0,0}, every long-term shareholder becomes insider trader, j(0) = n∗
and the number of short-term shareholders is equal to
m =

m∗ if ¯ q − 1 > L(0,0,n∗,m∗)
0 otherwise
(17)
Proof: According to Proposition 1, long-term shareholders would choose k∗ = 0 if
insider trading regulation is not enforced. Thus, imposing it through regulation does
not alter the outcome of the equilibrium without insider trading regulation. Q.E.D.
16As shown by the third column in Table 3, a stock repurchase regulation is useless.
It is not able to increase expected aggregate welfare by reducing underinvestment in
the risky asset.
Let’s now consider the scenario in which insider trading and share repurchase
regulations are implemented together.
Proposition 5: If both insider trading and open-market repurchases regulations are
enforced, secrecy or disclosure can both be equilibrium corporate policies, cp∗ = {0,d}.
Liquidity traders always invest in the risky technology, m = m∗. The ﬁrst best is
attained for every level of the risky return.
Proof: A multiple equilibrium arises because long-term shareholder are indiﬀerent
between secrecy and disclosure if they can not exploit corporate private information
for speculative purpose. Since the double regulation neutralize all the potential spec-
ulators (by both insider traders and the company), liquidity traders’ adverse selection
losses collapse to zero. The last part of the proposition is obtained through straight-
forward algebra. Q.E.D.
This proposition connects our study to earlier analyses of insider trading, which do
not consider adverse selection losses from stock repurchases. In our setting there are
no beneﬁts from insider trading, hence regulating it turns out to be welfare eﬃcient.
However this scenario without share repurchases is not realistic, as discussed in the
introduction, because they are allowed for several reasons, such as substituting cash
dividend payouts, modifying capital structure and reducing price volatility.
4.2 Mandated disclosure
Last but not least, we consider the introduction of a mandatory disclosure. This
implies that the parameter d is exogenously set to ¯ d, so that long-term shareholders
can only choose whether to carry out open-market repurchases.
Proposition 6: If disclosure is mandatory but insider trading regulation is not en-
forced, long-term shareholders choose not to carry out open-market share repurchases,
cp∗ = {0, ¯ d}. All of them become insider traders, j(0) = n∗, and the number of short-
term shareholders is equal to
m =

m∗ if ¯ q − 1 > L(0, ¯ d,n∗,m∗)
0 otherwise
(18)
This regulation leads to a welfare improvement.
17Proof: The ﬁrst part of the proposition is just a particular case of Proposition 1,
where now long-term shareholders can not choose d. Nevertheless the conclusions are
equivalent, as can be easily derived from the Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix. The
second part is instead due to the presence of a positive probability, ¯ d, that corporate
information reaches the market before trading takes place. For this reason short-term
investors, facing lower expected trading losses, invest in the risky technology for a
larger number of values of the risky return. Q.E.D.
Regulators do recognize that disclosure of price sensitive information “on a full
and prompt basis should certainly go some way towards reducing the likelihood that a
company will be holding a signiﬁcant informational advantage [...] while in the course
of purchasing its own shares” (OICV-IOSCO, 2004, p.10). The following proposition
concerns whether such a policy would beneﬁt from a ban on insider trading.
Proposition 7: If disclosure is mandatory and insider trading regulation is enforced,
long-term shareholders choose to carry out open-market share repurchases, cp∗ =
{1, ¯ d}. The number of short-term shareholders turns out to be equal to
m =

m∗ if ¯ q − 1 > L(1, ¯ d,0,m∗)
0 otherwise
(19)
Moreover, if µ < µ0 the combination of the two regulations is always sub-optimal
relative to mandated disclosure alone.
Proof: Again the ﬁrst part of the proposition draws upon the Proof of Proposition
2 in the Appendix. The second part is obtained through straightforward algebra since,
as in Proposition 3, it relies on the fact that, under the condition on the proportion
of short-term shareholders, liquidity traders’ expected loss is higher if insider trading
regulation is enforced. Q.E.D.
Thus a stricter regulation (disclosure plus insider trading regulation) is less ef-
fective than a softer one (only mandated disclosure) in raising the investment in the
risky technology by liquidity traders, as shown by the last two columns in Table 4.
We can therefore conclude that, even when a disclosure policy is mandatory, insider
trading should not be prohibited when open-market share repurchases are allowed.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) wonder why insider trading regulation is not enforced
in several countries, even if insider trading appears to raise the cost of capital by 5%.
18We suggest that the increase in the cost of capital might be larger, unless ownership of
companies in those countries is widely diﬀused. Indeed, misappropriation of corporate
information by insider traders appears to be welfare increasing in our paper when
ownership is concentrated, as ﬁrms will otherwise adopt information-based share
repurchase programs which increase short-term shareholders’ trading losses.
In countries where ownership of companies is concentrated, we highlight that a
ban on insider trading may help the ﬁnancing of companies only if information-based
open-market share repurchases are also curbed. This observation, in turn, shows the
limitations of the misappropriation theory as a basis for limiting insider trading: the
use of privileged information by the issuer is welfare decreasing even if it is not a
theft of information.
Our setting deliberately ignores interim investment and risk aversion in order to
emphasize the interplay between insider trading and corporate information policy.
Including the reaction of ﬁrm investment and production to the information content
of prices should not change our insights, as insider trading is based on information
produced within the ﬁrm, hence already embedded in ﬁrm real choices. Only if
information unknown to managers were disseminated by trading, then it could beneﬁt
corporate investment choices – as observed by Leland (1992).
The introduction of risk aversion would reinforce or weaken the result that a
ban on insider trading is welfare reducing when SR are allowed, to the extent that
information dissemination improves (Bhattacharya and Nicodano, 2001) or worsens
(Medrano and Vives, 2004) risk sharing. More importantly, a monopolistic trader –
such as the issuer – may be able to better distribute risk among shareholders than the
uncoordinated shareholders by themselves, as Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1990) suggest.
However, this demanding extension is left for further work.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We can consider a two stage game: in the ﬁrst stage long-term
shareholders choose the corporate policy (policy subgame), in the second one they decide
whether to enter the stock market as insider traders (entrance subgames).
To derive the equilibrium corporate policy, cp∗, let’s ﬁrst consider the four entrance
subgames, one for each alternative information allocation. In all entrance subgames the
strategic set of each insider trader consists in two strategies: Enter, NotEnter (the market).
Here we prove that, whatever is the strategic choice of n − 1 insiders and the information
allocation, the optimal strategy of the n-th insider is to Enter the market.
cp = {0,d} We analyze ﬁrst the two subgames associated with either secrecy (d = 0) or
disclosure (d = ¯ d). Since both a secrecy and a disclosure policies do not provide any proﬁt
from share repurchases to shareholders, the strategy NotEnter leads always to a zero payoﬀ,
while the strategy Enter guarantees a non-negative payoﬀ. The following payoﬀs matrix
clearly shows that for the n-th insider Enter is a dominant strategy, for m > 1. Hence, the
Nash equilibrium of these subgames is such that every insider enters the market. Moreover,




E (1 − d)π(n∗,m) ; (1 − d)π(n∗,m) (1 − d)π(1,m) ; 0
NE 0 ; (1 − d)π(n∗ − 1,m) 0 ; 0
cp = {1,d} Next we analyze the case of buy-backs, coupled with either secrecy or disclosure.
If share repurchases are part of the corporate information policy, Enter is still a dominant
strategy for the n-th insider for m > 1. However, since this result is less straightforward than
the previous one, let’s compare the n-th insider’s payoﬀs (given by the sum of distributions
of corporate proﬁts from share repurchases and of insider trading proﬁts), associated to the
strategies of the other n − 1 insiders. If the latter decide to enter the market, the strategy
Enter is the best response for the n-th insider if:
(1 − d)π(1 + n∗,m)
N + 1
N








(n∗ + 2) < n∗ + m + 1 (A2)
Let’s deﬁne the l.h.s. of the above inequality as F(n∗) and the r.h.s as G(n∗,m). Thus, we
have to prove that F(n∗) < G(n∗,m) ∀ n∗,m > 1. Let’s consider the following three steps:
20(i) we prove that F(n∗) < G(n∗,1) ∀ n∗ > 1:
√
n∗+1 √





which is always true for n∗ > 1.
(ii) we prove that G(n∗,m) < G(n∗,m0) ∀ n∗ > 1, m < m0: straightforward.
(iii) we can conclude that F(n∗) < G(n∗,1) < G(n∗,m) ∀ n∗,m > 1.
Since the above inequality is true for every n > 1, then the strategy Enter is still the best
response if n − 1 insiders decide not to enter the market:
(1 − d)π(2,m)N+1
N > (1 − d)π(1,m) 1
N (A4)
Again, the Nash equilibrium of these subgames is such that every insider enters the market.
In this case each obtains (1 − d)π(1 + n∗,m)N+1




E (1 − d)π(1 + n∗,m) N+1
N ; (1 − d)π(1 + n∗,m) N+1
N (1 − d)π(2,m) N+1
N ; (1 − d)π(2,m) 1
N
NE (1 − d)π(n∗,m) 1
N ; (1 − d)π(n∗,m) N+1
N (1 − d)π(1,m) 1
N ; (1 − d)π(1,m) 1
N
Finally, in order to determine the equilibrium of the policy subgame, we just need to
compare the payoﬀs associated to the Nash equilibria of the four entrance subgames. It
can be seen that d = ¯ d reduces (or at most leaves unchanged) all payoﬀs. Hence long-term
shareholders choose d = 0. For this reason we can focus on the remaining corporate policies,
secrecy and open-market repurchases. Secrecy is the equilibrium corporate policy if:









n∗ + m + 1
n∗ + m
(A6)
Let’s deﬁne the l.h.s. of the above inequality as F(n∗) and the r.h.s as H(n∗,m). Thus, we
have to prove that F(n∗) > H(n∗,m) ∀ n∗,m > 1. As before, let’s consider three steps:







n∗ + 1 >
√
n∗ (A7)
which is always true for n∗ > 1.





(n∗ + m)2 < 0 ∀ n∗,m > 1 (A8)
(iii) we can conclude that F(n∗) > H(n∗,1) > H(n∗,m) ∀ n∗,m > 1. Therefore,
cp∗ = {0,0}.
Turning now to short-term shareholders, it is possible to determine the cutoﬀ value
L(0,0,n∗,m∗) for the risky technology excess return, given {n∗,m∗,c,σ2
q,σ2
ξ,σ2
ϑ}. If (¯ q − 1)
exceeds L(0,0,n∗,m∗), then there exist an equilibrium characterized by {k = 0; d = 0;
N = N∗; c = 0}. So, the m∗-th liquidity trader invests in the risky technology if m∗ − 1 do,
since excess payoﬀ exceeds expected adverse selection losses coming from insider trading10. If,
instead, (¯ q−1) is lower than L(0,0,n∗,m∗), the unique equilibrium is characterized by {k = 0;
d = 0; N = n∗; c = 0} and there is underinvestment in the stock market (m = 0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let’s consider the same game as before: the policy subgame does
not change, while the four entrance subgames disappear. Indeed the strategic set in each
entrance subgame is now a singleton because the strategy Enter is eliminated by insider
trading regulation. Therefore, the two stage game collapses to the policy subgame, in which
long-term shareholders choose the optimal corporate policy.
In order to determine the equilibrium of the policy subgame, cp∗, we compare the payoﬀs
associated to the four degenerate subgames. If corporate policy is secrecy or disclosure of
private information, long-term shareholders gain zero proﬁts, because they “waste” their
private information. On the contrary, with share repurchases, they are able to exploit their
private signal and per-capita proﬁts from share repurchases are equal to (1 − d)π(1,m)N+1
N .
Again, long-term shareholders choose d = 0 and therefore we conclude that cp∗ = {1,0}.
Since the stock market is characterized by no insider trading and open-market share
repurchases is the equilibrium corporate policy, liquidity traders’ investment decision is driven
by the following cutoﬀ value for the risky technology excess return: L(1,0,0,m∗). If (¯ q − 1)
exceeds L(1,0,0,m∗), then there exist an equilibrium11 characterized by {k = 1; d = 0;
N = N∗; c = 1}. If, instead, (¯ q − 1) is lower than L(1,0,0,m∗), the unique equilibrium is
characterized by {k = 1; d = 0; N = n∗; c = 1} and there is underinvestment in the stock
market (m = 0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: We ﬁrst show that, given equilibrium outcomes, E(W|m) is indepen-
10The equilibrium could be not unique because L(k,d,j(c),m) is decreasing in m. Indeed, it
does not pay a liquidity trader to invest in the risky technology if others do not even if ¯ q − 1 >
L(0,0,n
∗,m
∗), unless ¯ q − 1 also exceeds L(0,0,n
∗,1). If we add this restriction, this well-known
multiplicity problem disappears.
11Again, we could have multiple equilibria because L(k,d,j(c),m) is decreasing in m. If we add
the restriction, ¯ q − 1 > L(1,0,0,1), the equilibrium becomes unique.
22dent of insider trading regulation.
E(W|m = m∗) =

n∗[¯ q + π()] + m∗[¯ q − n
∗
m∗π()] = N∗¯ q if c = 0
n∗[¯ q + ϕ(1)] + m∗[¯ q − 1
m∗π + ϕ(1)] = N∗¯ q if c = 1
(A9)
E(W|m = 0) = n∗¯ q + m∗ ∀ c (A10)
Equations (A9) and (A10) can be rewritten, in compact form, as:
E(W|m) = n∗¯ q + m∗ + m(¯ q − 1) ∀ c (A11)
Thus, it follows that
E(W) = n∗¯ q + m∗ + Pr(m = m∗) · m∗(¯ q − 1) (A12)
where Pr(m = m∗) is a degenerate probability since
Pr(m = m∗) = Pr(¯ q > L() + 1) = {0,1} (A13)
Q.E.D.


































Let’s ﬁrst deﬁne f(n∗) =
√
n∗(n∗ + 1)/2. Since we consider only strictly positive values











. Hence, we can ﬁnd the maximum proportion
of liquidity shareholders µ0 such that, for all µ < µ0, the above inequality is satisﬁed. This

















The second part of the proposition becomes straightforward once observed that the set
{¯ q : Pr(m = m∗|c = 0) > Pr(m = m∗|c = 1)} is non-empty. Q.E.D.
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25Table 3: Insider trading (IT) and share repurchases (SR) regulations
This table shows equilibrium information allocations (ﬁrst row) and aggregate welfare (other rows) associated
with securities regulation. The ﬁrst column highlights the three partitions of the risky asset excess return,
generated by short-term shareholders’ loss functions. The other columns represent four possible combinations
of regulations: c = 1 (c = 0) means that insider trading regulation is (not) enforced. SR regulation indicates
a ban on share repurchases. The shaded area represents the partitions of the excess return in which full
investment is reached in the market. When only insider trading regulation is enforced, the underinvestment
area widens. When both regulations are implemented full investment is attained in every partition.
SR regulation
IT regulation c = 0 c = 1 c = 0 c = 1
Info. Allocation cp
∗ = {0,0} cp
∗ = {1,0} cp



















∗¯ q + m
∗ n
∗¯ q + m
∗ n
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∗ N
∗¯ q
¯ q − 1 first best
26Table 4: Insider trading (IT) and disclosure regulations
This table shows the equilibrium information allocation and aggregate welfare when disclosure regulation is
combined with a ban on insider trading. The ﬁrst column highlights the three partitions of the risky asset
excess return, generated by short-term shareholders’ loss functions. The second one refers to the benchmark
case in which no regulation is enforced. The other two columns show the combination between insider trading
and disclosure regulation: c = 1 (c = 0) means that insider trading regulation is (not) enforced. The shaded
area represents the partitions of the excess return in which full investment is reached in the market. When
only disclosure regulation is implemented we obtain the second best allocation.
Mandated Disclosure
IT regulation c = 0 c = 0 c = 1
Info. Allocation cp
∗ = {0,0} cp
∗ = {0, ¯ d} cp
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¯ q − 1 second best
27Figure 1: Partitions of the risky asset excess return
These graphs show how the three partitions of the excess return, ¯ q − 1, generated by liquidity shareholders’
loss functions, respond to variations in liquidity shock variance, σ2






and proportion of liquidity shareholders, m∗/N∗. The higher is the variance of liquidity shocks, the higher
is the range of the excess return whereby full investment is not reached in the market if insider regulation
is enforced. The same relation holds for the signal precision. For the proportion of liquidity shareholders,
instead, the relation is reversed: this is so because total adverse selection losses are “paid” by a larger number
of shareholders. In the ﬁrst row of graphs we set σ2
q = 0.5 and σ2
θ = 0.1; in the second one σ2
ξ = 0.2.
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